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Abstract
This Essay suggests that simplification will actually complicate data protection and will lead
to unexpected burdens on industry along with an increase in the data surveillance of citizens. Part
I begins with an examination of the global push for simplification. Part II addresses the oppor-
tunities for simplification through multiple instruments and some of the experiences with these
instruments. Part III presents the obstacles to simplification. These obstacles illustrate fundamen-
tal problems with simplification. Part IV concludes with a proposal on “simplifying” technologies
that calls for the development and increased use of privacy rights management technologies and
technology audits to facilitate international data flows by simplifying the management of compli-
ance across complex regulatory requirements and procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
The variation and complexity of national data privacy rules
pose significant challenges for international data flows. Data
protection laws range from ad hoc narrow legal rights, like those
found in the United States, to comprehensive fair information
practice statutes like those found in Europe.' Because data
processing frequently occurs across national borders, multiple
data protection laws might apply simultaneously to international
data flows. At the same time, data protection regimes may pro-
hibit the circumvention of national standards by processing per-
sonal information at a foreign site. 2 Global information process-
ing thus presents a data controller with important burdens and
obstacles related to compliance with varying standards and pro-
cedures.
One answer to this problem is the simplification of interna-
tional data privacy rules. Proponents of simplification advocate
reducing the burdens of compliance that come with the applica-
tion of multiple data protection rules. While simplification can
also arise in the national context itself, such as the short notice
movement in the United States in connection with financial ser-
vices,3 for the global economy, proponents seek to facilitate in-
ternational data flows.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. An earlier version of this
Essay was presented to the Twenty-Seventh International Conference of Data Protection
Commissioners (Montreux, Switzerland, Sept. 14-16, 2005).
1. See e.g., PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY
OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 5 (1996).
2. See European Parliament and Council Directive No. 95/46/EC, art. 25, O.J. L
281/31, at 45-46 (1995) [hereinafter European Directive 95/46/EC] (on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data).
3. See Interagency Proposal to Consider Alternative Forms of Privacy Notices
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 75164 (proposed Dec. 30, 2003) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 40).
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For simplification to be successful as a facilitator of interna-
tional data flows, two critical conditions must be satisfied. First,
an adequate level of privacy must be preserved. Second, the
complexity and uncertainty of regulatory compliance must be re-
duced.
While these objectives are laudable, this Essay suggests that
simplification will actually complicate data protection and will
lead to unexpected burdens on industry along with an increase
in the data surveillance of citizens. Part I begins with an exami-
nation of the global push for simplification. Part II addresses
the opportunities for simplification through multiple instru-
ments and some of the experiences with these instruments. Part
III presents the obstacles to simplification. These obstacles illus-
trate fundamental problems with simplification. Part IV con-
cludes with a proposal on "simplifying" technologies that calls
for the development and increased use of privacy rights manage-
ment technologies and technology audits to facilitate interna-
tional data flows by simplifying the management of compliance
across complex regulatory requirements and procedures.
I. THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC PUSH FOR SIMPLIFICATION
The transposition of the European Directive on data protec-
tion into Member State law,4 the enlargement of the European
Union ("EU"),' and the movement toward EU-style data protec-
tion in non-EU countries,6 along with subnational rules-like
the American data security law in California 7-substantially in-
crease the body of data protection law around the world. As on-
line technologies mature, the sophistication of data processing
techniques further increases the complexity of compliance with
national data protection laws. On the Internet, interactive data
collection and processing will typically target and involve com-
puting resources in multiple jurisdictions. These contacts give
4. See European Directive 95/46/EC, art. 32, O.J. L 281/31, at 49-50 (1995). The
directive provided for a transition period of three years for Member States to transpose
the privacy standards into national law.
5. New Member States are required to have data protection laws that conform to
European Directive 95/46/EC.
6. See, e.g., Pablo Palazzi, La Transmisi6n Internacional de Datos Personales y la
Protecci6n de la Privacidad: Argentina, America Latina, Estados Unidos y la Uni6n
Europea 39-41 (2002) (discussing the expansion of the European model to non-Euro-
pean countries).
7. See CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (2003).
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States both the right and the obligation to assure data protection
according to the local rules where those contacts occur-usually
where the data subjects are located.8 Similarly, Internet technol-
ogies give States new and enhanced powers to enforce their deci-
sions online through electronic means. States can use electronic
instruments such as packet interception, worms, and service at-
tacks to sanction violators. 9
When companies and government agencies seek to send or
acquire data, the national differences in data protection regula-
tion create significant compliance problems for those transfers.
The multitude of applicable laws and regulations creates uncer-
tainty for global businesses. Some data transfers may be imper-
missible under a country's rules because of conflicts related to
the level of protection.1" Other data transfers may be permissi-
ble, but more difficult to accomplish because of differences in
standards such as consent requirements or formalities such as
notification procedures.
Responsible multinational companies find this environment
and the increasing complexity of managing compliance across
multiple sets of data protection regulation confusing and poten-
tially costly. This creates an incentive to seek simplified rules
that are consistent across borders.
At the same time, governments now face similar concerns.
Prior to the wave of Islamic terrorism over the last five years, the
focus on international data transfers was global businesses. This
emphasis has shifted to data transfers for security and law en-
forcement.1' Government agencies seek personal data from for-
eign organizations that are subject to local data protection re-
quirements. This often means that a multinational company can
be caught in the middle between a request from a government
where it does business and the obligations of data protection
8. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
1951 (2005). One should note that the interactive architecture of data processing will
make the European Court of Justice's decision in the Lindqvist case obsolete. See gener-
ally Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist, C-101/01, [2003] E.C.RI 1-12971,
[2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 20.
9. See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTrAwA TECH. L.J.
213 (2004).
10. See European Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, OJ. L 281/31, at 31 (1995).
11. See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 4, 37, 78-81
(2003).
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regulations where it collects personal information. In these situ-
ations, government agencies seek to use a local organization as
an intermediary agent to obtain data of foreign origin. The Pas-
senger Name Record ("PNR") case' 2 and the retention of elec-
tronic communications records' 3 reflect this dilemma for indus-
try. In the case of PNR, the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity ("DHS") sought the transfer of passenger data originating
from airlines in Europe to the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Bor-
der Control.'4 European regulators objected to the transfer.'
By contrast, European data retention requirements may impose
more stringent obligations on foreign communications service
providers than the home countries of those providers. Govern-
ments, as a result, now also have an incentive to simplify data
protection in order to facilitate international data flows for se-
curity and law enforcement.
II. OPPORTUNITY THROUGH MULTIPLE MECHANISMS
Various mechanisms offer opportunities to simplify data
protection for the cross-border treatment of personal informa-
tion. Instruments ranging from international law to technologi-
cal infrastructure each might accomplish simplification tasks.
However, experiences with most of these mechanisms raise ques-
tions for their success.
A. International Law/Treaty
International law provides the most obvious basis for simpli-
fication. The European Directive 95/46/EC 6 and Convention
12. See Agreement Between the European Community and the United States of
America on the Processing and Transfer of PNR Data by Air Carriers to the United
States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
May 28, 2004, O.J. L 183/84 (2004) [hereinafter PNR Data Agreement].
13. See European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2006/24/EC, O.J. L 105/
54 (2006), Retention of Data Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public
Electronic Communication Services and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC.
14. See Council Decision No. 2004/496/EC, O.J. L 183/83 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Working Party Opinion 2/2004 on the Adequate Protection of Profes-
sional Data Contained in the PNR of Air Passengers to Be Transferred to the United
States' Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 10019/04/EN, WP 87 (Jan. 29,
2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2004/wp87_en.pdf.
16. See generally European Directive 95/46/EC, O.J. L 281/31 (1995) (protecting
the right to privacy regarding the processing of personal data).
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108 of the Council of Europe 7 each sought to create more uni-
fied, straightforward rules by comparison to the standards in
place prior to the enactments. Further simplification, however,
through international law is both unlikely and improbable in the
short-term. Those instruments took years to implement.' 8 More
importantly, common procedures cannot exist effectively with-
out an acceptance of common standards of protection. At the
present time, common international standards and common in-
ternational procedures are each elusive. In addition, commonly
accepted protocols will not be sufficient. The implementation of
common protocols will necessarily rely on other mechanisms.
B. Legal Hybrids
Data protection for international data flows may also be sim-
plified through the use of legal hybrids. Legal hybrids are substi-
tutes for specific regulations that prescribe common standards
and procedures. 9 They attempt to give industry and govern-
ment a non-statutory mechanism for compliance with divergent
data protection standards. The principal impetus for legal hy-
brids came from Article 25 of the European Directive.2
1. Safe Harbor Agreement
The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement seeks to facilitate in-
ternational data transfers between Europe and the United States
and purports to assure compliance with European standards by
organizations processing European data in the United States. 2'
The mechanism is a legal hybrid because it anchors compliance
in a set of policies that are not part of data protection legislation
in the United States. The standards and enforcement mecha-
nisms in the Safe Harbor streamlined those found in the Euro-
pean Directive. 2 While the Safe Harbor was an expedient effort
17. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/enTreaties/Html/108.htm.
18. The European Directive was first proposed in 1990 and took five years for its
completion.
19. SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. RFv. 1315, 1332 (2000).
20. See European Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25, OJ. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
21. See generally Commission Decision No. 2000/520/EC, arts. 1, 5, OJ. L 215/7, at
8-9 (2000) (setting forth safe-harbor framework).
22. Maria Veronica Prez Asinari & Yves Poullet, Privacy, Personal Data Protection
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to avoid confrontation between the United States and Europe,
the mechanism has been ineffective. Both quantitatively and
qualitatively, the implementation of Safe Harbor has been em-
barrassingly weak.23 U.S. companies find the Safe Harbor pro-
cess cumbersome while the resulting data protection is confused
and often wholly insufficient. Since companies see a lack of re-
solve on the part of the European Union to enforce the Euro-
pean data protection regime, the use of Safe Harbor for compli-
ance has few tangible incentives.
2. Contractual Arrangements
Contractual arrangements between companies are another
important mechanism to solve compliance issues. Contractual
mechanisms are a private law solution with limited public over-
sight. The model contracts approved by the Article 29 Working
Party reflect this approach. 24 Companies wishing to use contrac-
tual arrangements to facilitate international data transfers can
obtain the approval of European data protection supervisory au-
thorities for their procedures. Contractual mechanisms, thus,
provide companies with assurances of multi-jurisdictional com-
pliance. However, the initial joint and several liability provisions
of the model contract clauses sanctioned by the Article 29 Work-
ing Party have discouraged companies from using the standard-
ized contracts.2 5 Going forward, organizations are likely to seek
variations on the model contracts that will reduce corporate obli-
gations toward data subjects, and the Article 29 Working Party
has recently shown some flexibility with respect to the joint and
several liability provision. 26
and the Safe Harbour Decision. From Euphoria to Policy: From Policy to Regulation... t in IN
THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CONTINUITY AMID DISCORD 101-
134 (2005).
23. SeeJan Dhont, Maria Veronica Peirez Asinari, Yves Poullet, Lee Bygrave & Joel
R. Reidenberg, Safe Harbour Implementation Study 105-06 (2004), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/justice.home/fsj/privacy/docs/studies/safe-harbour-
2004_en.pdf; see alsoJOEL R. REIDENBERG & PRIVACY LAws & BUSINESS, THE FUNCTIONING
OF THE U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES (Independent Consultant Study Report) (Sept.
21, 2001) (available from the European Commission).
24. See Commission Decision No. 2004/915/EC, O.J. L 385/74, at 75 (2004); see
also Commission Decision No. 2001/497/EC, O.J. L 181/19, at 21 (2001).
25. See Commission Decision No. 2001/497/EC, Annex, Standard Contractual
Clauses, cl. 6(2), oJ. L 181/19, at 26 (2001).
26. See Commission Decision No. 2004/915/EC, O.J. L 385/74, at 75 (2004).
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3. Binding Corporate Rules
The most recent hybrid is the concept of "binding corpo-
rate rules." Multinational organizations may comply with Euro-
pean data protection requirements through binding corporate
rules.27 If the European data protection authorities approve an
organization's internal rules and procedures, the private, inter-
nal corporate arrangement simplifies the task of satisfying local
data protection obligations. As a very new instrument, there re-
mains much uncertainty with respect to the minimum content of
binding corporate rules and the enforceability of such rules.
The pressure from multinational organizations is likely to push
the level of data protection toward the lowest common denomi-
nator in the corporate family that is acceptable to European su-
pervisory authorities. If successful, this effort will diminish the
level of data protection as compared to European standards.
C. Policy Instruments
For security and law enforcement access to privately held
personal information, simplification may occur through policy
instruments at the inter-governmental level. The agreement be-
tween DHS and the European Commission for the transfer of
passenger name record data from airlines in Europe to DHS il-
lustrates this type of mechanism. 2' The PNR protocol is, in ef-
fect, a political rather than a legal instrument. The commit-
ments are policy statements between governments that are not
enforceable through the legal system.
D. Technological Infrastructure
The most significant hybrid mechanism to comply with vary-
ing data protection rules is the architecture of the technological
infrastructure. Technological innovations move processing to
multiple jurisdictions. While these innovations will often lead to
multiple jurisdictional claims on data processing,29 technological
systems can arbitrate and automate compliance across different
27. See Article 29 Working Party, Working Document Establishing a Model Check-
list Application for Approval of Binding Corporate Rules, 05/EN, WP 108, at 2 (Apr. 14,
2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2005/wplO8_en.pdf.
28. See PNR Data Agreement, supra note 12.
29. See, e.g., European Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4(c), OJ. L 281/31, at 39 (1995).
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policy protocols. For example, compliance with multiple notifi-
cation procedures can be automated as can multiple consent re-
quirements and varying data subject access standards. Techno-
logical systems to incorporate multiple rules and procedures will
not be simple to develop, but once developed can greatly facili-
tate international data flows.
Several recent cases illustrate the emergence of this mecha-
nism. In the private sector, the P3P protocol and the movement
toward multilayered notices in the United States and Canada
demonstrate attempts to use infrastructure design as a way of ac-
commodating different privacy policies.30 Yet, some of these
early efforts, namely P3P, have stalled on the incorporation of
adequate privacy protections. In the security/law enforcement
sphere, the negotiations between the U.S. DHS and the Euro-
pean Commission over access to passenger name record infor-
mation also demonstrate the value of the design of the techno-
logical infrastructure to facilitate compliance. PNR access is to
shift from a "pull" infrastructure where the U.S. authorities
reach into European databases to a "push" infrastructure where
the European data controllers would send data to the U.S. au-
thorities. The more recent accord between Canada and the Eu-
ropean Commission for the transfer of PNR data to Canada uses
the "push" approach. 31 This design reduces concerns over com-
pliance with data minimization standards and over foreign sover-
eign acts within local jurisdictions.
III. OBSTACLES THROUGH VALUES CONFLICTS
Data protection values will raise important obstacles to sim-
plification. From the perspective of citizens, simplification nec-
essarily reduces the precision of data protection and, in some
jurisdictions, diminishes the level of privacy protection. This
30. P3P was designed as a technical standard that would allow users and web sites
to agree on privacy policies for the treatment of personal data collected by the web site.
See generally LORRIE FAITH CRANOR, WEB PRIVACY WITH P3P (2002). Similarly, the Onta-
rio Information and Privacy Commissioner has advanced the use of layered privacy no-
tices in the health care field. See, e.g., Ann Cavoukian, Managing Your Legal Obligations
Under PHIPA: Practical Advice and Best Practices in an Era of Privacy Transition
(2005) (powerpoint presentation), http://www.ipc.on.ca/docs/2005-05-04-Canadianln-
stitute.ppt.
31. See Agreement on the Processing of Advance Passenger Information and Pas-
senger Name Record Data, Mar. 21, 2006, E.C.-Can., art. 4, O.J. L 82/15 (2006) (requir-
ing that data be "pushed" from airlines rather than "pulled" by Canadian authorities).
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means that a primary goal of simplification-the preservation of
an adequate level of privacy-will be quite difficult to achieve.
From the perspective of industry, simplification has unintended
consequences for security and law enforcement that may result
in complex and costly procedures. This is counter to the second
goal of simplification-the reduction in cumbersome proce-
dures.
A. Weakening of Data Protection
Simplification inherently "dumbs down" or weakens data
protection for some of the jurisdictions that have authority over
the processing of personal information. An accord on common
standards and protocols necessitates the abandonment of partic-
ular requirements adopted by national legislatures and regula-
tors. The legal hybrids reflect this tendency. At the same time,
the legal hybrids do not protect industry or citizens from public
sector uses of privately held data. 2 Likewise, policy instruments
are subject to strong inter-State pressures that may not protect
citizens or industry. By contrast, technological infrastructures
can go either way: they may provide weaker data protection
through simplistic protocols or they may preserve data protec-
tion through more sophisticated, granular approaches.
Ironically, the inability of data systems to interconnect be-
cause of the complexity of regulatory compliance provides data
subjects with privacy. Compliance difficulties reduce seamless
data transfers and reduce the volume of data that may cross bor-
ders. In effect, personal information benefits from a "practical
obscurity." Practical obscurity is the limitation on data collection
and use that comes from a lack of standardization in processing.
This means that standards such as purpose limitations and data
minimization are enforced through practical barriers to data
transfers. Simplification undermines this inherent protection.
By facilitating seamless data transfers, simplification inevita-
bly encourages cross-border data mining and profiling. In com-
bination with weakened standards, this effect can translate into
remote surveillance activities by industry and law enforcement
that are contrary to data protection values.
32. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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B. Complicating Public Use of Private Data
The shift in focus for simplification from the private sector
needs to security and law enforcement purposes has important
consequences for data protection. The data flows between the
private and public sector mean that an increase in private sector
transfers through simplification will correspondingly mean an
increase in government desires to access privately held personal
information across borders. As private sector transfers become
more robust through simplification, law enforcement can use lo-
cal organizations as the intermediaries for access to remote data.
This will place industry in a difficult position. Law enforcement
orders addressed to local organizations are mandatory and may
be costly to manage. At the same time, such orders can under-
mine business relationships with trading partners and data sub-
jects. In short, simplification for the private sector assists law en-
forcement in ways that may not be intended and in ways that
escape traditional data protection.
IV. PROPOSAL: "SIMPLLYING" TECHNOLOGIES
The opportunities and obstacles for simplification suggest
that success will be very problematic for data protection and for
industry. The multiple mechanisms themselves become compli-
cated to manage as any organization may need to use more than
one mechanism for the totality of its data processing activities.
And, the mechanisms for simplification have important value
challenges.
To facilitate international data transfers while respecting
privacy, data protection can adapt a lesson from the intellectual
property community. Intellectual property has "digital rights
management" to secure copyright owners protection. Data pro-
tection should have "Privacy Rights Management" ("PRM") to se-
cure the fair treatment of personal information. Like its intellec-
tual property counterpart, PRM would package personal data
with associated rights, obligations and procedures that are inter-
preted and effected through technological means. Instead of
simplification that seeks to minimize compliance obligations,
"simplifying technologies" should emphasize the development of
the tools that robustly manage varying compliance procedures.
PRM technologies have two advantages for data protection
and supervisory authorities. First, the development of PRM will
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focus attention on the core policy decisions like the systems de-
sign issues did for the passenger name record case. Second,
technological systems themselves can be audited more easily
than data uses. Supervisory authorities can use automated tools
to detect changes in the technology or technical configurations
that impact on data protection.
Supervisory authorities should encourage the development
of PRM technologies with an increased emphasis on participa-
tion in development projects whether by industry, standards
bodies, or academic consortia. While this direction requires
high level technical and legal expertise, it will be particularly
useful to keep data protection functional in the global economy.
In the long term, however, policy and political differences
underlying the regulatory complexity are likely to be resolved
only through State-to-State compromises. PRM technologies will
highlight the deep points of contention and will hopefully over
time create conditions for an international legal instrument that
is suited to interconnected global networks.
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